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The religion clauses of the First Amendment share the same
fundamental purpose: to prevent extensive government involve-
ment in matters of religion.1 In simplified terms, one can say that
the Establishment Clause forbids government prescription of reli-
gion, and that the Free Exercise Clause forbids its proscription.
Thomas Jefferson conceived the clauses as erecting "a wall of sepa-
ration between church and state,"2 but this "separationist" concep-
tion-whatever its theoretical merits-offers little practical guid-
ance in the modern state, where government affects a much wider
range of private activity than at the time of the founding.3 Jeffer-
son's separation, "far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct,
and variable barrier."' 4 With a strict separation of church5 and
state unlikely or impossible, government neutrality toward religion
emerges as an alternative formulation of the clauses' objective., In
t B.A. 1987, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 1990, The University of
Chicago.
The clauses provide: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ." US Const, Amend I.
2 Letter to the Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan 1, 1802), in Ad-
rienne Koch and William Peden, eds, The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson
332 (Random House, 1972). See also Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v Jaffree, 472
US 38, 91-114 (1985) for a criticism of Jefferson's metaphor.
' The original amendment did not apply to the states, and the framers did not intend
them to be similarly constrained. Though the clauses were the evolutionary pinnacle of sep-
arationist efforts in Virginia, see Anson P. Stokes and Leo Pfeffer, Church and State in the
United States 65-71 (Greenwood Press, 1964), many of the other states openly sponsored
churches. Id at 78-82; Wallace, 472 US at 99 n 4 (Rehnquist dissenting); McDaniel v Paty,
435 US 618, 623 (1978). For a complete discussion of the religion clauses' historical context,
see Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms (Oxford, 1986). As the Fourteenth Amendment
significantly expanded the governmental action subject to the reach of the religion clauses,
it limited the possibility of separation.
4 Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 614 (1971).
5 This Comment uses the term "church" interchangeably with "religious institution."
Thus, "church-sponsored" or "church-operated" day care encompasses religiously affiliated
providers of all denominations.
6 Walz v Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 668-69 (1970); Committee for Public Education
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Justice Black's words, the government should not "pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an-
other. 17 And, to paraphrase his words and apply them to the free
exercise side of the neutrality equation, neither should the govern-
ment pass laws that hinder one religion, hinder all religions, or dis-
advantage one religion in comparison to another.8 But neutrality,
like strict separation, must often remain an ideal.
Consider the quest for "neutrality" in the context of a reli-
gious institution rendering a secular, regulated service such as day
care. At first blush, neutrality suggests that the state should expose
a church-sponsored day care provider to the same benefits, bur-
dens, and regulations as its non-religious counterparts. But treat-
ing church-sponsored day care providers like non-religious institu-
tions could create excessive burdens on the free exercise of religion.
Conversely, providing extensive exemptions could disadvantage
secular day care providers, with whom the church-sponsored prov-
iders compete. Neutrality is therefore an elusive end, the search for
which is circumscribed by threats of both the establishment of reli-
gion and infringement on free exercise.
Thus, despite their shared purpose, the religion clauses stand
in tension and present those who govern with a dilemma: whether
to exempt church-sponsored day care centers from state regula-
tion. This Comment examines the constitutional dilemma in day
care. The first section describes the basic conflict, reviewing the
nature and extent of church involvement in day care and catalogu-
ing the various forms of state regulation. Section II considers the
Free Exercise Clause challenges to regulation of church-sponsored
day care. Section III considers the Establishment Clause chal-
lenges, focusing on the controversy surrounding exemptions for
church-sponsored day care in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v Amos.9 Following
the contours of this case, the fourth section proposes an approach
to the regulation of day care that balances the demands of the reli-
gion clauses. The Comment concludes that those engaged in the
delicate process of accommodating the free exercise concerns of
v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 792-93 (1973).
Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15 (1947).
1 As one would expect, there are other conceptions of neutrality. Professor Kurland
defines neutrality as barring any religious classifications. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court, 29 U Chi L Rev 1 (1961). For an economic definition of
neutrality, see Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U Chi L Rev 1 (1989).
9 483 US 327 (1987).
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church-sponsored day care providers should focus on specific regu-
lations and specific objections. Administrative tailoring of the reg-
ulatory process to suit individual church-sponsored providers is the
least restrictive means of accommodating their free exercise con-
cerns while avoiding an impermissible establishment of religion.
I. THE DAY CARE DILEMMA: CHURCH INVOLVEMENT AND STATE
REGULATION
In First Amendment jurisprudence, "church" and "state" are
often treated as competing monoliths, each with its own well-de-
fined complement of interests and characteristics. A large part of
the day care dilemma is the absence of any such categorical coher-
ence. Churches provide day care services in widely different forms
for vastly different motives. And although all states' day care li-
censing regulations ostensibly share a common pur-
pose-protecting children's health and safety-no two states have
chosen the same means to that end. The various state regulatory
schemes have as many differences as similarities. This section pro-
vides a brief introduction to the complex nature of church and
state participation in day care.
A. Church Involvement
Churches have long played a significant role in nurturing and
educating the young. Although comprehensive nationwide data on
the extent and nature of church participation in day care is pre-
dictably missing, an ambitious study by the ecumenical National
Council of Churches ("NCC") sheds some light on the contours of
church involvement in day care. 10 The NCC canvassed over 14,000
church-housed day care programs and concluded that "church-
housed programs probably constitute the largest group of day care
providers in the nation."" Yet the study also revealed rich diver-
sity in the forms and purposes of church programs.
" This Child Day Care Project is described and documented in Eileen W. Lindner, et
al, When Churches Mind the Children: A Study of Day Care in Local Parishes (High/
Scope Press, 1983). The NCC is comprised of thirty-two Protestant, Anglican, and Orthodox
denominations representing over forty million Americans. While the study's results cannot
be extrapolated to all American churches, the NCC does represent a significant portion of
them, and its findings immeasurably increase the extant national information about church
involvement in child care.
" Id at 12. The NCC estimated "that the nation's churches, collectively, house part- or
full-day care for several million children." Id at 73.
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Significantly, forty-four percent of the study's church-housed
programs were only that: church-housed, not church-operated.12
The churches' involvement in these programs is limited to that of a
landlord, albeit a rather generous one.'" For day care tenants, the
appeal is fairly obvious: in addition to subsidization or waiver of
rent, utilities, and maintenance costs, church day care tenants ben-
efit from convenient locations, spaces that are often already
designed for small children, and most importantly, the tax-exempt
status of their gracious hosts.'4 For their part, the host churches
view the arrangement as an opportunity to contribute their facili-
ties to a worthy cause.' 5
The other fifty-six percent of the study's programs were
housed and operated by the host churches. The churches typically
view day care as an aspect of their particular ministries: some host
churches are simply trying to provide a valuable community ser-
vice, or to meet the day care needs of their congregations' families;
others act out of evangelism and a desire to promote Christian ed-
ucation.'" Yet despite these religious goals, almost none of the
church-operated programs restrict participation to members of
their own congregations, 7 and "symbols, practices, and teachings
commonly viewed as 'religious' are conspicuously absent from most
church-operated programs."' Church-operated day care centers
are, however, "much more likely to give some consideration to reli-
gious beliefs when hiring staff" than their independently-operated
counterparts. 9 Finally, and perhaps most surprising, the study
found that the great majority of church-housed day care centers
obtained state licenses for either part or all of their day care pro-
grams, even when not required to do so. 20
12 Id at 34.
13 Nearly half of the independently operated day care centers paid only token rent
($100 or less) or no rent at all, and eighty-seven percent received some sort of subsidy from
the host church. Id at 133-34.
14 Id at 19.
15 Id at 20-21.
16 Id.
17 Ninety-nine percent of the programs in the study were open to all members of their
respective communities. Id at 26.
" Id at 75. The study noted that church-operated centers are "somewhat more likely to
be concerned with the 'spiritual development of the child' than independently operated cen-
ters, but only a small minority of the centers consider this a high priority goal."
19 Id.
20 The study claimed "unanimous insistence" among the church-operated program di-
rectors interviewed that church-housed programs should "be held accountable for meeting
licensing requirements." Id at 105. Eighty-four percent of the day care centers licensed at
least part of their operations. Id at 58.
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This snapshot of church involvement in day care provides a
general picture that is too often obscured by the specific, high-pro-
file controversies considered in this Comment. If the NCC study
shows anything, it is that a substantial proportion of church-spon-
sored day care providers share the same standards and strive for
the same goals as secular day care providers.
B. State Regulation
The recent large-scale movement of women into the workforce
fueled an explosion in the demand for day care.2 As day care ser-
vices multiplied, so did the states' incentives to ensure their qual-
ity.22 Except for the common objective of protecting children's
health, safety, and well-being, however, the resulting regulations
are far from uniform. A description of the range of existing ap-
proaches and the most common features among state regulatory
schemes follows.
1. State licensing requirements.
State legislatures typically lay the foundations for the regula-
tion of day care providers by establishing broad areas of concern or
a set of minimum standards, and then delegating the bulk of spe-
cific rulemaking to a state administrative agency. The agency, typi-
cally the department of human services or its equivalent, is author-
ized to establish, monitor, and enforce a comprehensive licensing
program.23
This legislative authorization is often limited to licensing re-
quirements protecting children's "health and safety," a phrase
with remarkably elastic parameters. In their narrowest sense,
"health and safety" provisions are the basic fire, construction, and
building code regulations that apply to all public structures, in-
cluding places of worship; all the states regulate these basic physi-
cal aspects of day care facilities in the same manner as they regu-
21 The percentage of working mothers with children under six years of age almost
doubled from thirty percent in 1970 to fifty-seven percent in 1987. U.S. Census Bureau data,
cited in Pat Wingert and Barbara Kantrowitz, The Day Care Generation, in The Twenty-
First Century Family, Newsweek Special Issue 87 (Winter/Spring 1990).
22 Rapid, unregulated growth led to highly publicized examples of day care gone awry
and was often seen as a state crisis. See Fla Stat Ann § 402.301 Preamble (West 1986); and
Tex House Comm on Hum Res, 63d Tex Leg, Report on the Interim Study on Child-Caring
in Texas 7 (November 12, 1974). All fifty states and the District of Columbia now regulate
day care services.
23 See, for example, Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 36-883 (West 1982 & Supp 1989); NJ Stat Ann
§ 30: 5B-5(a) (West 1981 & Supp 1989).
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late public buildings.24 But in practice, protecting "health and
safety" often translates into regulating a much wider range of at-
tributes. Among the areas most frequently regulated are child/staff
ratios, personnel qualifications, and policies regarding nutrition,
discipline, record-keeping, and parental participation.25
However broad their interpretations of "health and safety,"
the states are nearly uniform in leaving certain areas alone: none of
the states has used this authority to regulate the curriculum. In
fact, most state authorizing statutes explicitly forbid regulation of
educational content.2 6 And many specifically note the intention to
safeguard freedom of religious instruction and training.
27
After the state agency promulgates licensure requirements,
day care providers typically apply for a license by demonstrating
compliance and sometimes paying a fee. Before receiving a license,
providers may also be subject to on-site inspection for verification
of compliance. The possibility of inspections usually continues af-
ter providers are licensed, and licenses often must be posted in a
visible location in the center.28 The requirements are usually en-
forced through criminal and civil penalties, including license
revocation. 9
2. Exemption from licensing requirements.
An increasing number of states provide special legislative ex-
emptions from licensing requirements for church-sponsored day
care providers, usually substituting secondary systems of regula-
tion. Often described as "registration," these alternatives to licen-
sure vary greatly, but their chief purpose is to accommodate the
unique free exercise interests of church-sponsored providers."
2 See, for example, NJ Stat Ann § 30: 5B-5(e); La Rev Stat Ann § 46: 1413B (West
1982 & Supp 1990).
25 See, for example, Ill Ann Stat ch 23, § 2217(a) (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp 1989).
"' California's statute is representative: "licensing reviews of a day care center shall be
limited to health and safety considerations and shall not include any reviews of the content
of any educational or training program of the facility." Cal Health & Safety Code §
1597.05(a) (West 1979 & Supp 1990). See also Ga Code Ann § 49-5-12(b)(6) (Michie 1986 &
Supp 1989).
2 Idaho's statute declares: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or re-
strict the teaching of religious doctrines, values, or tenets in a facility licensed under the
provisions of this chapter." Idaho Code § 39-1103 (1985 & Supp 1989). See also Tex Hum
Res Code Ann § 42.001 (Vernon 1980).
28 See, for example, La Rev Stat Ann § 46:1408C.
2 See Ga Code Ann § 49-5-12(r-t) for typical enforcement provisions.
30 See North Valley Baptist Church v McMahon, 696 F Supp 518, 528 nn 18, 19 (E D
Cal 1988), and accompanying text for a general discussion of registration provisions.
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Under registration, church-sponsored providers are often techni-
cally subject to many of the same regulations as secular providers,
but compliance is'more voluntary, with decreased monitoring and
less enforcement by the state. Enforcement is often relegated to
consumer-initiated judicial procedures instead of state-initiated
administrative oversight.'
States providing broad legislative exemptions often take pre-
cautionary measures. For example, exempt centers are still subject
to inspection to ensure compliance with basic health and safety
standards (narrowly construed).2 In addition, exempt centers may
be required to disclose their "unlicensed" status in any advertis-
ing.3 3 Some states require parents' informed consent to certain pol-
icies and procedures, including, for example, the center's discipline
practices. 4
Exemptions may also be granted by other branches of govern-
ment. Because the bulk of regulation is often left in the hands of
the implementing agency, many exemptions are effected at the ad-
ministrative level, where rulemaking, interpretation, and enforce-
ment provide opportunities to exempt. 5 In addition, the courts
may grant exemptions when reviewing legislative and administra-
tive actions involving church-sponsored day care. 6
3 The only enforcement mechanism in Alabama, for example, is the rather unimpres-
sive statutory reminder that district attorneys have discretion to investigate any allegations
against exempt centers. Ala Code § 38-7-3 (1975 & Supp 1989). This is not to say that all
registration statutes lack teeth. Consider Arkansas, whose version of registration is licensing
by another name. The only significant difference is that church-sponsored day care provid-
ers "voluntarily" submit to regulation. They are still required to substantially comply with
day care regulations and are subject to state inspection for verification. 1987 Ark Acts 20-78-
221. The scheme is considered in further detail below in the discussion of Arkansas Day
Care Ass'n, Inc. v Clinton, 577 F Supp 388 (E D Ark 1983) in the text at notes 95-104.
32 See, for example, Ala Code § 38-7-3; Ind Code Ann § 12-3-2-12.7(e) (West 1982 &
Supp 1989).
'3 Indiana requires each exempt center to refer to itself in advertising as a day care
"ministry" and "clearly state in all of its paid promotional advertising that the day care
ministry is providing day care as an extension of its church or religious ministry." Ind Code
Ann § 12-3-2-12.7(i).
31 Alabama requires disclosure of "staff qualifications; pupil-staff ratio; discipline poli-
cies; type of curriculum used in the learning program; the religious teachings to be given
each child; and the type of lunch program available." Parents and a representative from the
sponsoring church board must sign a prescribed affidavit testifying to the disclosure and
consent before any child may be enrolled and once every year thereafter. Ala Code § 38-7-3.
" Some state statutes explicitly provide for administrative latitude in granting exemp-
tions. Louisiana, for example, grants the Department of Health and Human Resources the
authority to grant exemptions if compliance is financially "impractical" or if the facility is
"meeting or exceeding the intent of a standard or regulation." La Rev Stat Ann § 46:1409E
and 46:14131-J.
"I See Section III.
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3. Subsidization.
Another form of more direct government involvement merits
brief mention. The federal government has long provided limited
assistance to day care efforts, 3  and encouraged states to follow
suit. Burgeoning demand has forced both the federal and state
governments to consider substantial increases in the subsidization
of day care. Despite intense controversy, it is likely the 101st Con-
gress will pass some version of increased day care subsidies during
the second session.3 8 Part of the concern, of course, is establish-
ment. Because subsidization invokes an entirely different Estab-
lishment Clause analysis than licensing requirements, particularly
with respect to content restrictions,39 this Comment assumes no
state subsidization and does not delve into its implications.
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND CHALLENGES TO REGULATION
A. The Compelling Interest Test40
The Supreme Court has described the Free Exercise Clause as
"embrac[ing] two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protec-
tion of society. ' '4 1 To determine if a regulation impermissibly inter-
" The federal government has provided: direct care, such as Head Start, 42 USC § 9831
et seq (1988): "demand subsidies," such as limited tax deductions and credits, 26 USC
§ 44(A) (1988); and auxiliary services to day care providers. See Rochelle Beck, Beyond the
Stalemate in Child Care Public Policy, in Edward F. Zigler and Edmund W. Gordon, eds,
Day Care: Scientific and Social Policy Issues 317 (Auburn House, 1982); and Sharon L.
Kagan and Theresa Glennon, Considering Proprietary Child Care, in Zigler and Gordon,
Day Care 403.
*8 Elaine S. Povich, Bitter Fight Expected Over Child-Care Bill, Chicago Tribune § 1
at 5 (January 22, 1990).
" A large part of the controversy over federal legislation c~nters on just this point. See
Joseph L. Conn, Day Care Debacle: Senate Adopts Voucher Plan for Sectarian Child Care
and Instruction. Will the House Follow Suit?, Church & State 4 (Sept 1989).
'0 Days before this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court released its decision in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 1990 US LEXIS 2021
(April 17, 1990) ("Smith IF'). Quite unexpectedly, and in the face of vigorous dissent, a 5-4
majority drastically narrowed the application of the compelling interest test. In Smith II,
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause permits a state to prohibit sacramental peyote
use and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use. Interpreted
broadly, the Smith II ruling suggests that generally applicable day care regulations are no
longer subject to the compelling interest test and will rarely, if ever, violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause. It remains to be seen, of course, how Smith II will actually be applied in the
day care or any other context.
" Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 303-04 (1940). The belief-conduct distinction
originated in Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 (1878), where the Court upheld a Mor-
mon's conviction for polygamy.
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feres with religious conduct, the Supreme Court applies a balanc-
ing approach often called the compelling interest test.42 Under the
test, the plaintiff must show that the regulation at issue burdens
conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.43 The bur-
den need not be direct or explicit in the regulation. 44 If the plain-
tiff establishes a free exercise burden, the regulation will only be
upheld if the state can demonstrate that it has a compelling inter-
est in the regulation 45 and the regulation is the least restrictive
means of serving the state's interest.4"
The least restrictive means requirement focuses the free exer-
cise inquiry. In the day care context, for example, it would be easy
42 The test emerged from Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599 (1961), and Sherbert v Ver-
ner, 374 US 398 (1963). For a more recent application, see Hobbie v Unemployment Ap-
peals Comm'n, 480 US 136 (1987).
43 Only the sincerity of the belief-not its truth-is at issue. United States v Ballard,
322 US 78, 86-87 (1944). It does not matter that other adherents to the same religion do not
hold the particular belief. See Thomas v Review Board, 450 US 707, 715-16 (1981) ("the
judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences" and "[c]ourts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation"); and United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 257 (1982) (the
Court declined to decide whether the Old Order Amish plaintiff's belief was "the proper
interpretation of the Amish faith"). And the belief need not be "logical, consistent, or com-
prehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Thomas, 450 US at
714. It must, however, be "rooted in religion" and not merely the plaintiff's "personal philo-
sophical choice." Id at 713-14. For a recent critique of the Court's approach to the burden
inquiry, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 102 Harv L Rev 933 (1989).
"' "Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed
by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by reli-
gious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and
to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect,
the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial." Thomas, 450 US at 717-18.
See also Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 16 (1947). But see Braunfeld, 366 US at
606-07 ("To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only
an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful
the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the
legislature.").
" Sherbert defined this "paramount" interest as involving "some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order." 374 US at 403, 407. Later cases reveal that the standard for
"compelling" is dependent on the implicit balancing of interests that the test entails. The
Thomas Court, for example, reiterated that "'only those interests of the highest order' can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 450 US at 718 (emphasis
added), quoting Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 215 (1972). Interests that the Court has
found sufficiently compelling include: national security, Gillette v United States, 401 US
437 (1971); the social security system, Lee, 455 US at 258; the prevention of racial discrimi-
nation, Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574 (1983); the prevention of polyg-
amy, Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 (1878); and the protection of children, Prince v
Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 167 (1944) (upholding child labor law that prevented Jehovah's
Witness child from proselytizing).
" Thomas, 450 US at 718. This requirement often remains implicit. See Lee, 455 US at
258-59.
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to declare the ultimate importance of either side's interest: the
state seeks to protect children's health and safety;4" church-spon-
sored day care providers seek to preserve their religious freedom.48
The least restrictive means requirement assures that the issue in
an individual case will be the degree to which a particular state
requirement infringes upon the specific religious beliefs or prac-
tices of a church-sponsored day care provider, and the degree to
which the state's interest would be jeopardized by granting that
provider an exemption.4 9 Thus, whether free exercise is infringed
depends on specific regulatory provisions, the nature of the reli-
gious objections to them, and the possibilities for satisfying the
state's interest in less intrusive ways.
B. Free Exercise Objections
Day care providers may raise either specific or general objec-
tions to a state's day care regulations. Specific objections target in-
dividual licensing requirements, with the church-sponsored day
care provider claiming that one or several requirements burden
particular aspects of its religious exercise. General objections target
regulation itself: the church-sponsored day care provider claims
that its service is a religious exercise, and protests any state re-
strictions or mandates as a burden on free exercise.8 0
17 No court reviewing child care licensing provisions has found this compelling state
interest lacking. In large part, the Supreme Court assured this result with its declaration
that "[i]t is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils
[affecting children] is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to
control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action." Prince, 321 US at
168-69.
48 Only rarely do courts find that church-sponsored day care plaintiffs failed to estab-
lish religious burden. See North Valley Baptist Church v McMahon, 696 F Supp 518 (E D
Cal 1988), discussed below at note 62.
'9 See Yoder, 406 US at 236 ("weighing the minimal difference between what the State
would require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent on the State to show
with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would
be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish"); and McConnell and Posner,
56 U Chi L Rev at 53 (cited in note 8).
50 A Maryland legislator protested that Maryland's licensing statute means that per-
mission to operate a ministry "comes from [Maryland Governor] Don Schaefer and not from
God." Churches Unite Against State Licensing of Church Ministries, Christian News (De-
cember 19, 1988). Some of the church-sponsored day care providers that assert general ob-
jections do not object to the particular licensing requirements, and in fact might be in full
compliance. State v Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 SW2d 692, 694 (Tex
1984). Others assert specific objections as well. See North Valley Baptist Church v McMa-
hon, 696 F Supp 518, 524 (E D Cal 1988).
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1. General objections
When a party objects to the whole notion of government in-
volvement in day care regulation, the emphasis placed in the bal-
ancing process upon least restrictive means is likely to doom the
objection. For example, in North Valley Baptist Church v McMa-
hon, North Valley claimed that submitting to licensure constituted
"a clear violation of the Lordship of the Lord Jesus Christ" over
the church." In applying the compelling state interest test to the
claim, the federal district court found that the state regulation
burdened North Valley's religious expression but that the scheme
furthered the state's compelling interest in protecting the health
and safety of children in day care. The case thus turned on "the
extent to which recognition of an exemption from the licensure re-
quirement would impede the objective sought to be advanced by
the state. '52 After considering the facts, the court found that the
state had no effective, less restrictive alternative to advance its
compelling interest; some form of regulation was necessary to pro-
tect the children's health and safety. 3
2. Specific objections.
Specific objections to licensing requirements present a variety
of possible outcomes under the compelling interest test. The
strength of a state's interest in the particular regulatory standard
is a critical variable. Some standards, particularly those requiring
compliance with seemingly insignificant statutory details,54 re-
present slight state interests. For example, Texas's regulatory stan-
dards require, among other things, that children participate in
community activities, that clothing provided for children meet cer-
tain community standards, and that children not be required to
perform at public gatherings.5 5 Though one can posit a number of
51 696 F Supp at 522. North Valley objected to any form of regulation that required
state approval (even most registration plans would fall victim to a challenge this broad). Id
at 530.
11 Id at 527.
5 Id at 529-530. Courts in both Texas and Michigan have rejected similar general ob-
jections to regulation. See People's Baptist, 683 SW2d at 696; and Dept of Social Services v
Emmanuel Baptist, 388 NW2d 326, 330-31 (Mich App 1986).
51 Even the authorizing statutes are often dedicated to detail. North Carolina's statute,
for example, requires that nap-time mats "shall be of a waterproof, washable material at
least two inches thick and shall be stored so that the floor side does not touch the sleeping
side." NC Gen Stat § 110-91(1) (1989).
5" 40 Tex Admin Code Ann §§ 83.614 et seq (Vernon 1980 & Supp 1989). The Texas
Child Care Licensing Act has generated considerable church-state litigation. See the series
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state interests behind each of the standards, it is also likely that
several of the standards would fare poorly under the compelling
interest test if applied to some church-sponsored day care provid-
ers. Imagine, for example, application of the community participa-
tion and community dress standards to those who wish for reli-
gious reasons to set themselves apart from the community. The
standards promote a comparatively slight state interest, but would
impose a substantial burden on religious freedom. In such cases,
granting an administrative exemption would produce only a margi-
nal sacrifice of the relevant state interest. The particular standard
is only tangential to the state's fundamental interest, and it still
applies to all other day care providers for whom the standard poses
no religious burden.
Other standards at the core of the state's health and safety
concerns represent significant state interests. Many states, for ex-
ample, authorize the regulation of day care providers' disciplinary
policies. 6 In Dept. of Social Services v Emmanuel Baptist Pre-
school, 57 the Emmanuel Baptist Preschool argued that the Michi-
gan guidelines governing corporal punishment in day care facilities
violated the biblical injunction, "spare the rod, spoil the child. ' 58
Emmanuel asserted that a sincere religious belief dictated that it
literally use a rod-in modern terms, a ping pong paddle.5 9 A
Michigan appellate court found that Emmanuel's religious exercise
was burdened by a corporal punishment standard, but that the
state's compelling interest in protecting its children justified the
of cases initiated by Reverend Lester Roloff, culminating in People;s Baptist, 683 SW2d at
692. For an excellent discussion of the day care controversy in Texas, see Comment,
Church-State Conflict under the Texas Child Care Licensing Act: A Ten-Year History, 39
Sw L J 1049 (1986).
56 See, for example, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 5104.011(A)(3) (Page 1989); and Ill Ann Stat
ch 23 § 2217(a)(10) (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp 1989).
" 388 NW2d 326 (Mich App 1986). Over two years after it heard oral arguments and
just as this Comment was going to press, the Michigan Supreme Court issued a memoran-
dum opinion in this case. Dept. of Social Services v Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, No 79024
(April 9, 1990) ("Memorandum Opinion"). Four "concurring" opinions accompanied the
memorandum opinion, leaving the Michigan Supreme Court deeply fractured over the out-
come. This Comment was unable to take the various concurrences into account but does
note the four holdings on which the court was able to agree.
11 The administrative guidelines outlining the acceptable forms of spanking stipulated
that "[n]o instrument is to be used to spank a child, except the open palm of the program
director's or caregiver's hand." 1980 AACS, R 400.5107 as interpreted in Department of
Social Services Instructional Memorandum No 80-09 (d), quoted in Emmanuel, 388 NW2d
at 333. The biblical passage is found in Proverbs 13:24 (King James ver) ("He that spareth
his rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him chaseneth him betimes.").
59 388 NW2d at 333.
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infringement.6 0 The state's interest is at a zenith when its regula-
tion bears directly on the day care provider's basic physical and
emotional treatment of the children under its care."'
Just as the strength of the state's interest varies from stan-
dard to standard, so does the extent to which any given standard
burdens the religious exercise of church-sponsored day care pro-
viders. Thus, the Michigan court's finding that Emmanuel's reli-
gious exercise was burdened by a corporal punishment standard
does not indicate whether other churches are also burdened by
such standards. When a church challenged California's much more
restrictive corporal punishment provision, the court found that the
standard did not burden the church-sponsored day care provider's
religious exercise. 2
Because the relative strengths of state interest and religious
burden depend upon the particular case, some states attempt to
accommodate specific objections to licensing standards at the ad-
ministrative level, when doing so will result in only a marginal sac-
rifice of the state's interest. Consider the following examples of ad-
ministrative accommodation.6
80 Emmanuel, 388 NW2d at 334. The court did not explicitly consider any less restric-
tive means through which the state could have secured its interest. But, as is often the case,
the analysis may have been implicit. The state did not attempt to prohibit corporal punish-
ment, but instead provided guidelines designed to allow flexibility for day care providers
(especially those who felt they needed to administer corporal punishment), while retaining
certain minimum protections for children.
81 The Michigan Supreme Court's only point of unanimity was in upholding the state's
corporal punishment provision. Emmanuel, Memorandum Opinion at 5.
82 See North Valley Baptist Church v McMahon, 696 F Supp 518 (E D Cal 1988). 22
Cal Admin Code § 101223(3) requires that children "be free from corporal or unusual pun-
ishment, infliction of pain, humiliation, intimidation, ridicule, coercion, threat, mental
abuse, or other actions of a punitive nature." 696 F Supp at 520. The court found that
North Valley's objection to the standard was not founded on religious belief; most likely to
his lawyer's dismay, North Valley's pastor had testified that the practice of spanking in the
preschool was permitted, but not religiously required, by the church. Id at 532. Although it
is hard to imagine that many specific objections that reach trial are resolved in this way, the
case aptly demonstrates that the actual burden on religious exercise of any particular licens-
ing standard is highly dependent on the specific beliefs of individual church-sponsored day
care providers.
It may be that many of the church-sponsored day care providers' actual objections are
general in nature, but that the futility of objecting on general grounds has led them to
fashion specific objections in an attempt to have entire licensing schemes, as applied to
church-sponsored providers, declared unconstitutional. In Emmanuel, many of the church's
specific objections pointed to potential state intrusion into their religious affairs. In re-
jecting one specific objection, the court noted that Emmanuel seemed "to be voicing a gen-
eral objection to governmental intrusion into church affairs through licensing" more than a
specific grievance concerning an actual interference. 388 NW2d at 334-35.
63 Documented examples of administrative accommodations are, of course, somewhat
limited. Neither the recipient nor the state has any reason to challenge them. Moreover,
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California's regulatory scheme provides no legislative exemp-
tions for church-sponsored day care, and was challenged by a
church-sponsored preschool in the North Valley case. One of
North Valley's specific objections targeted the "religious services
provision," which requires that each child "be free to attend reli-
gious services or activities of his/her choice and to have visits from
the spiritual advisor of his/her choice. '6 4 North Valley argued that
the provision prevented it from conducting church services as part
of its daily curriculum, and that the provision also required it to
entertain visits from "spiritual advisors" of other churches. 5 In re-
sponse, the defendant administrative agency offered uncontested
evidence that it had interpreted and administered the provision as
a parental consent requirement; participating parents were in-
formed in advance about the religious aspects of church-sponsored
day care, and their consent to the particular provider constituted
the "choice" as to religious services and counsel. The court found
that the provision, "as so interpreted and enforced . . . [did] not
conflict with plaintiffs' religious beliefs. '66 In effect, the imple-
menting agency had granted an administrative exemption.
Similarly, a Michigan provision contested in Emmanuel re-
quires that day care providers foster "a positive self-concept"
among children. 7 The church-sponsored preschool objected that
the provision-which they deemed a codification of secular human-
ist values-violated the fundamentalist doctrine of the "innate de-
pravity of mankind, which holds that all human beings are sinners
in need of salvation." The preschool further argued that state in-
spectors could use the provision to prevent the further teaching of
this fundamentalist doctrine. But a representative of the defen-
dant agency testified that the provision "speaks to the way chil-
dren are handled, i.e., whether they are belittled or demeaned by
adults, or made to feel inferior to other children." '68 The court
agreed with the state's assessment and declared it would not "in-
validate a statutory scheme merely because it may be subject to an
unconstitutional interpretation. ' 69 In essence, the court found no
only a handful of states accommodate in this way. See Section IV.
64 22 Cal Admin Code § 101223(a)(5), quoted in North Valley, 696 F Supp at 520.
6 North Valley, 696 F Supp at 533.
66 Id.
6.7 1980 AACS, R 400.5106(1)(c) (quoted in Emmanuel 388 NW2d at 332).
68 388 NW2d at 332.
69 Id at 333. The Michigan Supreme Court implicitly affirmed this holding when a ma-
jority upheld, with enumerated exceptions, application of the entire regulatory scheme to
Emmanuel. Memorandum Opinion at 5-6.
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colorable objection to the statute because the state had granted an
interpretive administrative exemption similar to California's treat-
ment of its religious services provision. 0
Administrative consideration of specific objections is perhaps
most effective in the hard cases, where the state's interest and the
religious burden are both clearly established. Another specific ob-
jection in Emmanuel contested a Michigan provision which estab-
lished minimum educational requirements for day care program di-
rectors, including a minimum of sixty completed semester hours at
an accredited college or university.71 Emmanuel objected that the
requirement prevented it from choosing a director who possessed
compatible religious beliefs,72 since most of the church's preschool
directors were hired from fundamentalist Christian colleges, which
typically object* to accreditation. 3 Though the lower court held
that the educational requirements were an unconstitutional viola-
tion of Emmanuel's free exercise, the appellate court reversed and
held for the state, relying on a special administrative exemption
that the state granted to church-sponsored day care providers like
Emmanuel. The exemption freed license applicants from any ad-
ministrative rule if there was clear and convincing evidence of
compliance with the intent of the rule. 4 In this way, the state had
presented church-sponsored day care providers with an opportu-
nity to engage in their own form of "least restrictive means" evalu-
ation. They could exempt themselves from administrative regula-
tion by assuring the state that its compelling interest was being
served.
III. CHALLENGES UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Given the extensive array of objections to state regulation and
the accompanying potential for significant Free Exercise Clause
70 The holding was also at least partially due to the strength of the state's interest in
preventing emotional abuse. Id.
7. 1980 AACS, R 400.5104(2) (cited in Emmanuel, 388 NW2d at 331).
72 388 NW2d at 331.
73 Id. For a general discussion of the controversy over accreditation and the religion
clauses, see Matthew B. Durrant, Accrediting Church-Related Schools: A First Amendment
Analysis, 38 Ark L Rev 598 (1985).
74 1980 AACS, R 400.5118 (cited in Emmanuel, 388 NW2d at 331). There was also
evidence that the Department of Social Services had developed a special set of criteria for
measuring the competence of graduates from church-affiliated colleges. This administrative
exemption can be seen as an attempt to use the least restrictive means concept to achieve
Michigan's interest in quality care for its young children. The Michigan Supreme Court
specifically forbade the state from "enforc[ing] the accreditation aspects of the program
director qualification rule. . . ." Memorandum Opinion at 6.
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controversy, it should not be surprising that some states seek to
avert church-state conflicts by exempting church-sponsored day
care providers from certain day care standards. Unfortunately,
these exemptions raise their own set of constitutional concerns.
This section addresses the Establishment Clause challenges to
state involvement in day care.
A. The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court, admitting it could but "dimly perceive
the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of
constitutional law," announced in Lemon v Kurtzman a three-
prong test to measure the constitutional validity of state actions
under the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion... ; finally,
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.' -7
The Lemon test has engendered volumes of interpretation and
two decades of debate, but has endured as the framework for most
of the Supreme Court's subsequent Establishment Clause deci-
sions."" The three-part analysis can be summarized briefly as fol-
lows. The first prong-secular purpose-reflects the expectation
that legislation be intent-neutral. State action should not be aimed
at benefiting a religion or all religions. Alternatively formulated,
the class that is the object of the legislation must have a common
denominator broader than religion.77 The second prong-primary
effect-means that state action should neither "encourage[] nor
discourage[] participation in religious life."'78 This is the expecta-
tion that legislation be essentially effect-neutral. 79 The third
7- 403 US 602, 612-13 (1971), quoting Walz v Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 674 (1970).
78 The Court has noted that the Lemon analysis "provides 'no more than [a] helpful
signpos[t]' in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges." Mueller v Allen, 463 US 388,
394 (1983), citing Hunt v McNair, 413 US 734, 741 (1973). The Court avoided the Lemon
analysis altogether in Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783 (1983) (upholding challenge to legisla-
ture's paid chaplain), opting for a historical analysis instead. But the Court continued to use
Lemon analysis in the late 1980s. See Bowen v Kendrick, 487 US 589 (1988); Texas
Monthly, Inc. v Bullock, 109 S Ct 890 (1989); Hernandez v Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 109 S Ct 2136 (1989); and County of Allegheny v ACLU, 109 S Ct 3086 (1989).
77 Walz, 397 US at 696 (Harlan concurring). The exception is presented by exemptions,
in which the class, by definition, is religious in nature. See note 127.
78 Walz, 397 US at 697 (Harlan concurring). Before its incorporation into the Lemon
formula, this aspect was labeled "voluntarism."
7' The Court often speaks of a "benevolent" neutrality in this regard. Walz, 397 US at
669. Here, too, the Court employs a common denominator analysis. A religious organization
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prong-excessive entanglement-is meant to prevent the deleteri-
ous commingling of church and state functions and activities.80 In
practice, the entanglement prong has proved notoriously
amorphous.
There are two general categories of Establishment Clause
challenges to state regulation of day care, each of which stands in
tension with the other. State decisions to exempt church-sponsored
day care providers from licensing standards may be challenged as
unduly advancing religion, while state decisions to impose statu-
tory or administrative standards on church-sponsored day care
providers may be challenged as creating excessive entanglement. 1
B. Challenges to Religious Exemptions
Secular day care providers and others often assert that ex-
empting church-sponsored day care providers from licensing re-
quirements has the effect of impermissibly advancing religion. The
critical question is how far beyond the requirements of the Free
Exercise Clause the state may permissibly accommodate church-
sponsored day care providers before implicating the prohibitions of
the Establishment Clause. Although the Supreme Court has never
considered the day care issue specifically, it recently rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to a religious exemption in another
context. That decision, Corporation of Presiding Bishop v Amos, 82
has affected the day care exemption inquiry in lower courts and
contains important implications for the interaction of the religion
clauses. This section therefore first considers the Court's jurispru-
dence on religious accommodations, in particular the Amos deci-
sion, and then explores the application of these cases to day care
exemptions.
may benefit from legislation only as a member of a broader category of recipients, such as
non-profit organizations. See Texas Monthly, Inc., 109 S Ct at 897-98 (striking down Texas
sales tax exemption for religious periodicals as lacking "sufficient breadth").
80 Lemon discussed two varieties of entanglement: administrative oversight and politi-
cal divisiveness. 403 US at 621-22. Justices White and Rehnquist, dissenting in Roemer, 426
US at 767 (1976), and Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Aguilar v Felton, 473 US 402, 421
(1985), take issue with this prong of the test, suggesting it only reconsiders intent and effect.
81 Needless to say, the state is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't in developing
standards for church-sponsored day care. It is hard to imagine that the Establishment
Clause supports these conflicting propositions.
82 483 US 327 (1987).
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1. Supreme Court accommodation jurisprudence and Amos.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence provides the following
constitutional guidelines concerning accommodation: sometimes it
is required, 3 sometimes it is permitted,s4 and sometimes it is pro-
hibited. 5 The confusion arises because challenged accommodations
are analyzed under the three-part Lemon test.8 6 Neither the pur-
pose nor effect of accommodation is neutral toward religion. In
Corporation of Presiding Bishop v Amos,8 7 the Court addressed
the confusion and explicitly considered Lemon's application to ac-
commodations, particularly religious exemptions.
At issue in Amos was § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,88
which exempts religious organizations from the ban on religious
discrimination imposed by Title VII of the Act. 9 The plaintiff/re-
spondent was an employee of a Salt Lake City non-profit gymna-
sium that was owned and operated by the petitioner corporation,
an affiliate of the Mormon Church (Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-day Saints). He was fired when he no longer qualified as a
member of the church in good standing, and brought suit under
Title VII. The church claimed exemption under § 702. The District
Court ruled for respondent, holding that § 702 violated the second
prong of the Lemon test because it had the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
"' See Thomas v Review Board, 450 US 707, 719-20 (1981); Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US
205, 234-35 n 22; and Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398, 409 (1963). Any result other than
requiring accommodation would create an irreconcilable contradiction between the clauses.
8' See Zorach v Clauson, 343 US 306, 312-15 (1952) (upholding release time program
for public school students to allow them to attend off-campus religious classes). The Court
has found "room for play in the joints" between the clauses that allows legislatures leeway
in choosing accommodations that are neither required by the Free Exercise Clause nor pro-
hibited by the Establishment Clause. Walz, 397 US at 669-73; and Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S Ct Rev 1, 29-34.
85 See Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985) (Alabama's moment of silence for voluntary
prayer in public schools violated Lemon's secular purpose prong); and Estate of Thornton v
Caldor, 472 US 703 (1985) (absolute right not to work on a designated sabbath violated
Lemon's primary effect prong).
11 Numerous courts and commentators have pointed to the analytical anomalies of as-
sessing the constitutionality of accommodations under the Lemon rubric. See, for example,
Wallace, 472 US at 82-83 (O'Connor concurring); and McConnell, 1985 S Ct Rev at 44, 58-
59 (cited in note 85).
87 483 US 327 (1987).
8 As amended, 42 USC § 2000e-1 (1982).
89 Section 702, in pertinent part, states: "This title shall not apply to . . . a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities." 42 USC §
200e-1.
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and discussed each part of the Lemon test as it applies to religious
exemptions.
With regard to secular purpose, the Court declared that "it is
a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant govern-
mental interference with the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious missions." 90 Exemptions allevi-
ate the "significant burden on a religious organization ... to pre-
dict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious."9 '
In essence, the Court relaxed secular purpose scrutiny in reviewing
challenged exemptions.
In discussing primary effect, the Court explained that the kind
of government action the founders meant to proscribe was "spon-
sorship, financial support, and active involvement"92 in religious
matters. Thus, "[a] law is not unconstitutional simply because it
allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose.
For a law to have forbidden 'effects,' the Government itself must
have advanced religion through its own activities and influence."93
Finally, the Court asserted that because a religious exemption fully
alleviates the "intrusive inquiry into religious belief," it is quite
effective at avoiding excessive entanglement.94
2. The day care cases.
The application of Amos exemption analysis to day care cases
has the potential to profoundly alter courts' approaches to Estab-
lishment Clause challenges of religious exemptions for church-
sponsored day care providers. The effect of Amos is best demon-
strated by first reviewing the day care cases that pre-date it, and
then turning to the emerging case law that injects Amos's princi-
ples into day care exemption analysis.
a. Pre-Amos cases. Arkansas Day Care Ass'n, Inc. v Clin-
ton95 provided a federal district court the unique opportunity to
rule on alternate versions of religious exemptions in the same con-
troversy. 98 Arkansas had both a narrow registration scheme97 and a
" Amos, 483 US at 335.
' Id at 336.
9 Id at 337, quoting Walz, 397 US at 668.
" Amos, 483 US at 337 (emphasis in original).
Id at 339.
, 577 F Supp 388 (E D Ark 1983).
,' Over several years, the Arkansas legislature established a series of religious exemp-
tions to the state's Child Care Facility Licensing Act. Because the legislature failed to repeal
several of the provisions, a dual system of exemptions for church-sponsored day care provid-
ers developed. See Arkansas Day Care, 577 F Supp at 390-94.
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rather broad blanket religious exemption in place simultaneously;
day care providers were subject to one or the other according to
their date of establishment.9" The court applied Lemon analysis to
uphold the registration scheme as "a reasonable accommodation to
the religious beliefs recognized by the legislature,"99 and to invali-
date the blanket exemption as an "over-accommodation."' 100 While
the ruling rested partially on the state's seemingly arbitrary appli-
cation of separate sets of exemptions, 10' the court also advanced
several important distinctions between the two approaches to ex-
empting church-sponsored day care providers.
The court found that the registration scheme did not bestow
"any significant or substantial advantage, economic or other-
wise ' ' 0° on church-sponsored day care providers. And it approved
of the registration scheme's purpose of "encouraging the establish-
ment of day care centers which provide safe and wholesome envi-
ronments."'0 3 However, the court invalidated the broad exemp-
tions because they failed to adequately protect the state's interests
in regulating day care.10 4
In Forest Hills Early Learning Center v Lukhard,0 5 the
Fourth Circuit invalidated an expansive religious exemption for
church-sponsored day care providers. At issue was Virginia's ver-
sion of registration, under which church-sponsored day care prov-
iders were required only to register, fulfill minimum notice and
97 Enacted in 1983, Act 245, Ark Stat Ann §§ 20-78-209 (1987), exempts church-spon-
sored day care providers from licensing requirement, but in most other respects requires
them to conform to the same regulations as secular providers. Arkansas Day Care, 577 F
Supp at 392-93.
98 Id at 394. The broader version, enacted in 1981 as Act 518, Ark Stat Ann § 83-918,
exempted church-sponsored day care providers from most regulations, except for local fire,
health, and safety standards. It prohibited inspection except in cases of suspected child
abuse. Arkansas Day Care, 577 F Supp at 393.
'9 Arkansas Day Care, 577 F Supp at 396.
Id at 398.
101 Id.
102 Id at 396.
103 Id at 397. Although the court's language can be construed to say that the valid pur-
pose was that of encouraging more day care, which in general meets an important social
need, the language comes dangerously close to an endorsement of the particular virtues of
church-sponsored day care. The court's emphasis on primary effect and its more casual ap-
proach to secular purpose are representative of accommodation exemption analysis even
before Amos. So long as accommodations did not have the primary effect of advancing
church-sponsored care, courts were willing to fudge on secular purpose.
10I Id at 398.
105 728 F2d 230 (4th Cir 1984).
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disclosure requirements, and abide by the already applicable local
fire, health and safety codes. 106
The Fourth Circuit invalidated the Virginia exemption as
"overbroad in relation to the secular legislative purpose claimed
for it."'10 7 Virginia had asserted that the secular purpose was the
accommodation of religious day care providers' free exercise rights.
While the court acknowledged the potential validity of such a
claim,'08 it found insufficient evidence of possible infringement on
religious exercise to justify the breadth of the exemption. 0 9 The
court's unwillingness to relax its scrutiny of secular purpose
seemed clearly related to the ambitious breadth of the challenged
exemption." '
The court remanded the case for further consideration, sug-
gesting that the affected class of church-sponsored day care prov-
iders (none of which was involved in the litigation at that point)
intervene and present its free exercise case to the district court."'
The case eventually returned to the Fourth Circuit, complete with
the affected class of church-sponsored day care providers," 2 but in
the meantime the Supreme Court had issued its holding in Amos.
b. Post-Amos cases. The Fourth Circuit's reexamination
of the Forest Hills case is a particularly appropriate example of
the effect Amos has had on the Lemon inquiry regarding exemp-
tions for church-sponsored day care providers. Taking its cue from
Amos, the Fourth Circuit this time ruled that it was "a permissible
"00 The only other applicable substantive requirement was a set of minimum staff-child
ratios. Church-sponsored providers were also exempt from any enforcement mechanisms ex-
cept, of course, the local fire, health, and safety authorities. Va Code §§ 63.1-196.3 (1950).
See the discussion in Forest Hills, 728 F2d at 235-37.
107 Forest Hills, 728 F2d at 244.
108 Id at 241.
"I "Certainly it cannot be the case that merely by asserting such a legislative purpose
in litigation the state is entitled to have its legislature's accommodation to assumed free
exercise rights confirmed by the courts without any judicial inquiry into the validity of the
assumption. The requirements of judicial deference to legislative recognition of constitu-
tional rights cannot be thought to run that far." Forest Hills, 728 F2d at 240. In fact, the
court cited evidence suggesting that the church-sponsored day care providers did not object
to many of the specific objections from which they were exempted. Id at 243-44.
110 Id.
"I Id at 245. See also Forest Hills Early Learning Center v Lukhard, 789 F2d 295 (4th
Cir 1986) (a second hearing resulting in another remand to allow intervention). Without the
presence of affected church-sponsored providers, consider the irony of the resulting litiga-
tion positions. The state, having established a religious exemption as an accommodation, is
left to defend the validity of the free exercise claims, instead of defending any compelling
interest it had in the regulation of day care.
11 Forest Hills Early Learning Center v Grace Baptist Church, 846 F2d 260 (4th Cir
1988), cert denied, 109 S Ct 837 (1989).
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and sufficient legislative purpose to alleviate significant govern-
mental interference with the ability of religious organizations to
define and carry out their religious missions,"113 and upheld Vir-
ginia's broad exemption. The court explained that the kinds of
"burdens" that were of concern in Amos were evident in this case:
Absent the exemption, some church leaders would immedi-
ately be forced to violate their convictions against submitting
aspects of their ministries to state licensing, or face legal ac-
tion by the state. This would be an unseemly clash of church
and state which the legislature might well wish to avoid. Our
earlier opinion shifted to the churches the initial burden of
producing evidence "to establish the extent, if any, of their
free exercise rights in the exempted activities." As a result,
they have already been put to the difficult and intrusive bur-
den of attempting to persuade a secular court of the sincerity
and centrality of the beliefs they consider threatened by gov-
ernment licensing.114
As the court suggests, Amos eliminates Lemon's first prong from
the exemption inquiry, so that the government no longer need
demonstrate that a free exercise burden passes the compelling in-
terest test in order to survive an Establishment Clause inquiry.
Legislatures need not relate their exemptions to grounds any more
specific than the general accommodation of free exercise."'
3. Accommodating Amos: The danger of misapplication.
But does Amos fit the day care context? The best justification
for the Fourth Circuit's turnabout is deference to the state legisla-
ture. Amos holds that it is legitimate for legislatures to be con-
cerned about potential free exercise infringements, and on that ba-
sis alone to pass exemptions to prevent them. Under this view, it is
not the role of the judiciary to second-guess a legislative decision
to accommodate by reassessing the free exercise claims. The only
13 Forest Hills, 846 F2d at 263, quoting Amos, 483 US at 335.
11 Forest Hills, 846 F2d at 263 (citation omitted).
11 The Supreme Court of Illinois has also relied on Amos's formulation of the Lemon
test to uphold Illinois's relatively narrow religious exemption. Pre-School Owners Ass'n v
Department of Family Services, 518 NE2d 1018, 1024-25 (ill 1988), upholding Ill Ann Stat
ch 23 § 2212.09(i) (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp 1989). The statute exempts church-sponsored
facilities that care for children over three years of age only if the providers are tax-exempt,
receive no governmental aid, operate primarily to provide religious instruction, meet fire,
health, and safety codes, and are operated in conjunction with a non-profit, religious ele-
mentary school.
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real question for judicial determination is whether the exemption
is an establishment. At the margins-when exemptions go too far
and are establishments, or when licensure requirements impose un-
due burdens on free exercise-the Constitution protects religious
freedom. But this leaves considerable maneuverability and discre-
tion for the legislatures in their attempts to both license and
accommodate.'16
Prudence, however, still requires careful consideration of how
Amos should be applied in the day care context. Enthusiasm for
the secular purpose solution does not require abandoning scrutiny
of primary effect. Yet this is the present danger. When courts prior
to Amos relaxed the secular purpose prong, as in Arkansas Day
Care and Forest Hills, they accorded greater weight to the primary
effect prong of the inquiry.117 Given its relaxation of the secular
purpose prong, the Amos Court might have been expected to cau-
tion against the possible impermissible effects of broad accommo-
dations. But the Court described the primary effect inquiry with
surprisingly broad, accommodationist language. A careful look at
the Court's decision in Amos, however, reveals that it thoroughly
considered primary effect and explicitly found "no persuasive evi-
dence ... that the Church's ability to propagate its religious doc-
trine through the Gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior
to the passage [of the exemption] ....,"I" The employment dis-
crimination exemption granted to the church-sponsored gymna-
sium provided the Church no economic or other secular advantage.
In fact, the exemption was actually an economic disadvantage in
that the gymnasium used it to limit its employee hiring pool.
There is simply no economic advantage in being an employer who
hires only Mormons.
The nature of regulation and exemptions is dramatically dif-
ferent in the day care setting. State licensing standards almost in-
116 In a dissenting opinion in Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398, 418 (1963), Justice
Harlan, joined by Justice White, defended the notion of state flexibility. Under this view, a
state could "permit a legislative judgment accommodating an unemployment compensation
law to the exercise of religious beliefs such as appellant's." Id at 423. But the state is also
not "compelled to carve out an exception to its general rule of eligibility in the present case.
Those situations in which the Constitution may require special treatment on account of
religion are ... few and far between." Id.
"' In Arkansas Day Care, the court seemed willing to fudge the secular purpose in-
quiry because the challenged registration scheme was narrow and provided no economic or
other advantage to the church-sponsored day care providers it affected. 577 F Supp at 396.
Compare Forest Hills, where the court placed emphasis on the breadth of the challenged
exemptions in refusing to relax the scrutiny of secular purpose. 728 F2d at 243-44.
'" Amos, 483 US at 337.
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variably limit and burden day care providers, so that exemptions
from licensing standards do provide an economic advantage. If a
church-sponsored day care provider, for example, can only hire its
program director from an accredited college or university, it will
have to pay her more than if it could choose from the larger em-
ployee pool. This economic burden often accompanies even minor
licensing requirements. And the more exemptions, the bigger the
advantage. Thus, exempting churches from day care licensing re-
quirements advantages them in a way that exempting them from
religious discrimination statutes does not.
In short, acknowledging that accommodation of free exercise is
an appropriate secular legislative purpose should not also obviate
an inquiry into the possible effects of the accommodation. But this
is exactly what the Fourth Circuit did in its reexamination of For-
est Hills after Amos. The pre-Amos Forest Hills court never
needed to reach the effects inquiry, since it based its decision on
secular purpose. But on reexamination, the court failed to carefully
scrutinize effects only because it misapplied Amos. It merely cited,
without more, Amos's conclusions about the primary effect of
granting an exemption from Title VII to a Mormon-sponsored
gymnasium.
An appropriate Establishment Clause inquiry into exemptions
for church-sponsored day care providers requires courts to examine
the effect of the particular exemption, as the Supreme Court did in
Amos. In fact, in the day care context it is often likely that the
reviewing court will have to consider the effects of an exemption
on a particular day care provider. As discussed earlier, the bulk of
rule development, monitoring, and enforcement, including exemp-
tions, is often relegated to administrative agencies. In many cases
the religious exemption will have been granted by the administra-
tive agency to a specific applicant with a specific objection.
C. Entanglement Challenges
The second category of Establishment Clause challenges to
state regulation of day care focuses on a state's decision not to ex-
empt-in other words, the decision to impose statutory or adminis-
trative standards on church-sponsored day care providers. The
question is whether such a regulation violates Lemon's third prong
by creating excessive entanglement. Here it is useful to consider
Lemon in context. Lemon involved a Rhode Island statute that
provided salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in non-
public elementary schools, and a similar Pennsylvania provision
that reimbursed non-public schools for teaching specified secular
[57:573
Dilemma in Day Care
subjects.'19 As in most of the parochial aid cases, the recipient non-
public schools were overwhelmingly sectarian. The Court held that
both statutes violated the entanglement prong of the test because
they would require an impermissible degree of state surveillance in
order to assure that the funded courses were sufficiently secular to
satisfy the effects prong of the test.120
There are three reasons to reject entanglement challenges to
regulations unaccompanied by subsidies. First, invoking the Estab-
lishment Clause to invalidate regulation confuses the textual divi-
sion of labor between the religion clauses.12 ' While it is useful to
conceive of both the religion clauses as seeking "to mark bound-
aries to avoid excessive entanglement,"' 22 establishment entangle-
ment is concerned-as was Lemon-with excessive surveillance in
the unique context of government sponsorship or aid that should
not reach church-sponsored institutions qua churches. But plaintiff
church-sponsored day care providers are describing free exercise
entanglement: excessive state interference with their religious
practices. 23
This distinction undercuts Amos's assertion that granting reli-
gious exemptions prevents entanglement-the assertion is actually
nothing more than an observation that granting religious exemp-
tions prevents free exercise entanglement, which is not particularly
surprising or insightful. And contrary to Amos's implication, when
a state decides not to exempt (aid) a church-sponsored institution,
no threat of establishment entanglement is present. The state has
no reason to delve into the separability of the sectarian and secular
aspects of the regulated provider. 124
Second, the use of Lemon's entanglement prong to invalidate
state regulatory requirements imposed upon church-sponsored day
care providers is difficult to reconcile with Lemon's effect prong
because it results in "unequal state treatment" of the religious and
"' Lemon, 403 US at 606-07.
120 Id at 614.
121 Entanglement challenges were rejected for this very reason in both Emmanuel, 388
NW2d at 335, and People's Baptist, 683 SW2d at 694-95.
121 Walz, 397 US at 670. When the state either advances or infringes upon religious
practice, its involvement with religion has become excessive.
113 This assertion of Free Exercise Clause interests under the rubric of the Establish-
ment Clause has been called "negative establishment." See Forest Hills, 728 F2d at 238 n 6
(negative establishment "involve[s] questions ... that we think are wholly subsumed within
the more direct question whether and to what extent free exercise rights of the sectarian
operators may have been burdened .... ).
11 People's Baptist, 683 SW2d at 695.
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non-religious day care providers. 125 The irony of this interplay be-
tween the "Scylla and Charybdis of 'effect' and 'entanglement' ,,126
is more an indictment of the Lemon test's internal inconsistency
than the entanglement prong itself. But the conflict between
Lemon's second and third prongs is more acute when the test is
used to assess the constitutionality of exemptions. 27
Finally, to grant the Establishment Clause entanglement ob-
jection without considering the free exercise analysis would be tan-
tamount to allowing church-sponsored organizations to "occupy
the field" by entering an otherwise secular, regulated activity and
then protesting the presence of regulation, not any actual religious
burden resulting from the regulation. In our highly regulated wel-
fare state, the mere coexistence of state regulation and church par-
ticipation in a given area should not govern First Amendment
analysis.
IV. MITIGATING TENSION BETWEEN THE CLAUSES: A PROPOSED
APPROACH TO STATE REGULATION
This Comment began by noting the difficulties of satisfying
the demands of both religion clauses when a church participates in
an otherwise secular, regulated service. The first problem is that
state regulations may impose substantial burdens on churches' reli-
gious freedom. To minimize free exercise burdens, states often
grant exemptions, either at the legislative or administrative level.
The second problem is that these efforts to accommodate free
exercise, if cast too broadly, may result in an impermissible estab-
lishment of religion. In Amos, the Court recognized that granting
religious exemptions is consistent with Lemon's secular purpose re-
quirement; the Court will defer to legislatures within the zone be-
tween the requirements of the two religion clauses. But Amos
should not be read as relaxing the primary effect inquiry for ex-
125 This unequal treatment impinges on Lemon's second prong. People's Baptist, 683
SW2d at 695.
.26 Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 788
(1973).
127 In her concurring opinion in Wallace v Jafree, Justice O'Connor noted that "[o]n
the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting
religious observers from generally applicable government obligations. By definition, such
legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion. On
the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exer-
cise of religion would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to
religion can be viewed as an 'accommodation' of free exercise rights." 472 US 38, 81-82
(1985).
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emptions: a solution which solves the tension between the clauses
by eviscerating the Establishment Clause is no solution at all. A
better solution is to make sure that the accommodation net is not
cast too broadly. This requires a more closely tailored approach to
the free exercise inquiry.
A. The Ideal State Statute
The ideal state approach 2 8 to the regulation of day care pro-
viders would entail a dual regulatory scheme of licensure and regis-
tration. The registration scheme would exempt qualified church-
sponsored day care providers from the set of foreseeably objection-
able requirements that are only peripheral to the state's compel-
ling interest in protecting children, such as the need to obtain a
"license" and post it on the premises, the assessment of fees, and
any regulation of curriculum content or program material. Church-
sponsored day care providers would qualify for registration by
their tax-exempt church status; church-housed but independently
operated programs that are not themselves tax-exempt church or-
ganizations would not qualify.
Church-sponsored day care providers would still be sub-
ject-just like secular day care providers-to the full complement
of health and safety standards, such as staff-child ratios, discipli-
nary policies, and traditional enforcement mechanisms, with the
following critical exception: the registration scheme would provide
a mechanism for church-sponsored day care providers to apply for
and obtain administrative exemptions from any specific provision,
including enforcement procedures. The church-sponsored day care
provider seeking specific exemptions would be required in each
case to accompany its request with an affidavit by the sponsoring
church's spiritual leader affirming the religious nature of its objec-
tions. The provider would also be required to submit a brief expla-
nation of how it proposes to satisfy the intent of the relevant
regulation.
The affidavits would be considered proof per se of sincere reli-
gious objection. The critical part of the request for exemption
would be the church-sponsored day care provider's assurance of
compliance in spirit. The authorizing statute would encourage the
administrative agency to work together with church-sponsored
128 For another suggested approach to state regulation of "social service ministries," see
Carl H. Esbeck, State Regulation of Social Services Ministries of Religious Organizations,
16 VaIp U L Rev 1, 54 (1981).
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providers to develop solutions. In this way, the scheme would pro-
vide a thumb-on-the-scales for granting specific exemptions to
those church-sponsored day care providers with religious objec-
tions. It would include a system of appeal and review for rejected
applications, but the statutory and administrative goal would be to
accommodate the specific objections of church-sponsored providers
to the fullest extent compatible with the protection of children's
health and safety.
Finally, church-sponsored day care providers exempted from
specific provisions would be subject to notice and disclosure re-
quirements to assure informed parental consent to their individual
practices and policies.
B. The Virtues of Administrative Accommodation
This system of administrative accommodation strikes a bal-
ance between the demands of the religion clauses. The Free Exer-
cise Clause requires the state to serve its compelling interest in
childrens' health, safety, and well-being through means that least
restrict church-sponsored day care providers' religious expression.
The Establishment Clause prevents the state from granting
church-sponsored day care providers a significant competitive ad-
vantage over secular day care providers. The state must neither
maintain unswerving control, nor allow unbridled freedom; it must
choose its exemptions carefully.
The legislature is not suited to this task. Recall the complexity
of weighing free exercise objections. First, there are an almost infi-
nite number of possible regulations and religious objections. Par-
ticular state legislatures do not know which regulations will be
promulgated, or what objections will be raised against them. Sec-
ond, the relative weight of church and state interests, and the mar-
ginal sacrifice to each, will vary from situation to situation. But the
legislature is forced to consider interests in a vacuum, void of criti-
cal context. An administrative agency is in a far better position to
conduct a least restrictive means inquiry informed by the circum-
stances of individual situations.
The other option is to grant blanket exemptions for the
church-sponsored day care providers. But, like general objections,
general exemptions are untenable because compelling state inter-
ests will necessarily be sacrificed, even when there is no religious
objection. 129 Moreover, considering the wide range of specific li-
129 Imagine the youngster whose parents place him, because of his family's sincere reli-
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censing requirements that a blanket religious exemption would
necessarily vitiate, impermissible advancement of the religious over
the secular day care provider is almost inevitable.
Administrative accommodation may be criticized as creating
excessive entanglement. But the entanglement criticism confuses
the two versions of entanglement present in the religion clauses. As
explained above in section III, Establishment Clause entanglement
concerns the deleterious consequences resulting from government
aid to religion. The entanglement at issue here is that prohibited
by the Free Exercise Clause-the entanglement that represents an
undue burden on religious exercise. This is precisely the burden
that administrative accommodation of free exercise, by definition,
is meant to alleviate. The compelling interest test's least restrictive
means requirement is the free exercise version of entanglement.
When the state searches for the least restrictive system of regula-
tion that still satisfies its compelling interest in the health, safety,
and well-being of its children, it should simultaneously find the
least entangling system.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have often described the existence
of room for play between the religion clauses. This Comment as-
serts that in the day care context there is less room than some
have supposed. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
Amos, state efforts to accommodate should be well-tailored to the
actual objections of individual church-sponsored day care provid-
ers and cognizant of establishment concerns. Particularly in this
context, where church and state ostensibly share a concern for chil-
dren's well-being, it is appropriate for both to work together to-
wards reasonable regulations that protect children and impose the
least possible intrusion on religious exercise.
gious beliefs, in a church-sponsored day care center. The state legislature has granted a
blanket exemption for all such church-sponsored centers from all of the relevant licensing
requirements, except the fire, building, and sanitation codes. Thus, at his day care center
there is neither monitoring nor enforcement of the otherwise applicable corporal punish-
ment provisions. If he is severely beaten, then, in effect, he is punished for exercising reli-
gious choice. In fact, all of the children in the state who exercise a religious choice to attend
a church-sponsored day care center are deprived of their health and safety by having to
attend sub-standard day care facilities. And the risk is largely unnecessary because the vast
majority of the exempted providers do not actually have religious qualms about the regula-
tions. See note 20.
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